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Abstract:
This paper uses stochastic simulations on calibrated models to assess the steady state
impact of different pension arrangements in an environment where financial markets
are less than perfect. Surprisingly little is known about the optimal split between
funded and unfunded systems when there are sources of uninsurable risk that are
allocated in different ways by different types of pension system and where there are
imperfections in financial markets (eg transactions costs or adverse selection) . This
paper calculates the expected welfare of agents in different economies where in the
steady state the importance of unfunded, state pensions differs. We estimate how the
optimal level of unfunded, state pensions depends on rate of return and income risks
and also upon the actuarial fairness of annuity contracts. We focus on the case of
Japan where aging is rapid and unfunded pensions are currently generous.
I.  Introduction:
The old age dependency ratio in nearly all developed economies (the ratio of those of
pensionable age to those of working age) will be substantially higher in the future.   If
unfunded (pay-as-you-go), state pensions are to continue to provide the larger part of
retirement incomes, then contribution rates in most countries will have to be
substantially higher to balance the system.   The desirability of providing a significant
proportion of retirement income from unfunded pensions is therefore a key policy
issue. It has generated a large literature on the reform of pension systems (see, for
example, Feldstein (1996); Feldstein and Samwick (1998); OECD (1996); Mitchell
and Zeldes (1996); Disney (1996); Kotlikoff (1996); Huang, Imrohoroglu, and
Sargent  (1997); Miles and Timmerman (1999); Sinn (1999) and Campbell and
Feldstein (2001)). If unfunded pensions have substantial advantages then it might be
worth paying the costs of higher contribution rates to preserve them.   But if greater
reliance on other sources of pension income, most obviously income from funded
pensions (or more generally from private saving), can replace unfunded pensions
without adverse affects (for example on risk), then there would be associated long-run
benefits of a higher capital stock and lower, potentially less distortionary, labor taxes.
But funded and unfunded pension systems allocate risk in different ways, so any
analysis of the long-run implications of different degrees of reliance on funded and
unfunded pensions has to consider the welfare implications of different risk allocation
mechanisms.
3Key to this issue is how effectively financial markets allow individuals to insure
against important risks. With pensions systems one of the most important risks
reflects uncertainty over individual longevity. A crucial determinant of the optimal
split between private, funded pensions (which we think of here as individual
retirement accounts) and state, unfunded pensions is therefore the effectiveness of the
annuities market. This paper models the performance of different pension
arrangements allowing for imperfections in financial markets. We investigate the
steady state properties of different pension arrangements allowing for agents to
choose portfolios for funded pensions in an environment of less than perfect annuities.
We illustrate the issues in the context of pensions policy in Japan. For Japan the
pensions issues are particularly difficult: unfunded pensions are currently very
generous; aging is projected to be unusually rapid and the government is already
heavily in debt and running large deficits. We look ahead to a Japan where the
demographic changes currently under-way have worked themselves through so that
the population structure has stabilized – but to a position with very many more elderly
people than exist today. We ask what pension arrangements would be desirable in an
environment where life-expectancy is greater, the dependency ratio higher and where
risk averse agents cannot insure fully against important risks. We consider what
portfolios of assets agents hold and in doing so add to the literature on asset allocation
over the life-cycle. Although we calibrate the model by using projected future
Japanese mortality rates our results have general relevance since what is likely to
happen to life-expectancy in Japan is common to developed countries.
Any model that wants to say something useful about risk and uncertainty must take
account of several factors:
1. that individuals face substantial, largely idiosyncratic, uncertainty about their
labor income.
2. that returns on most financial assets are volatile and uncertain.
3. that to the extent that individuals depend upon their own accumulated funds
for retirement resources the way in which annuities markets work is important
(state run, unfunded systems will be unaffected by the efficiency of annuities
markets because the government is effectively providing insurance itself).
4The central policy issue we address is one which is relevant in all economies: what is
the desirable split between funded and unfunded systems when there are sources of
uninsurable risk that affect risk averse agents and where those risks are allocated in
different ways by different types of pension system? This issue has been analyzed in a
rapidly growing literature.  Merton (1983) addressed the issue and showed that in
general a mixed system had benefits on standard portfolio allocation grounds.
Feldstein and Ranguelova (1998) and Feldstein, Ranguelova and Samwick (1999)
consider uncertainty about rates of return and how it affects the transition to funded
systems. But they do not consider idiosyncratic risks that are important in practice and
which individuals find it hard to insure against. Bohn (1999) analysed the impact of
uncertainty about future demographic structure, but did not consider either rate of
return or labor income uncertainty.
Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu and Joines (1995 and 1999a) investigate the role of social
security in a general equilibrium setting with labor income uncertainty but non-
stochastic rates of return and no annuities. Huang, Imrohoroglu and Sargent (1997)
focus on the intergenerational impact of various social security systems on transition
paths. They allow for stochastic labor income but there is no uncertainty on rates of
return. (See Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu and Joines (1999b) for an excellent survey on
computational models of social security)).
The nearest paper to our own is Campbell, Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (2001). They
consider the long-run pattern of lifetime savings and portfolio allocation in the
presence of income and rate of return uncertainty and with various pension
arrangements. They do not consider the impact of varying degrees of imperfection in
annuity markets but do consider fixed costs of entering the equity market. Since the
efficiency of annuity contracts is central to the desirability of private, funded pension
systems - particularly of individual retirement accounts - we consider modeling the
impact of different degrees of imperfection in this market to be important.
Personal funded pensions may allow people to insure perfectly against some risks – if
annuities are available at actuarially fair rates then length of life risk can be avoided.
But personal pensions mean that labor income risk from working years, which will
have an impact on the contributions to a personal pension fund, have lasting effects
5upon pension income; such pensions obviously also generate rate of return risk. Given
this we consider what role might be played by unfunded, state pensions that give
varying degrees of insurance against labor income risk and are not dependent on rate
of return risk. We look at two types of unfunded pension - flat rate pensions and
unfunded pensions that depend on the income earned at the end of the individual's
working life.
What is new about this paper is that it allows one to assess the impact of alternative
pension systems in a world where there are multiple of sources of uncertainty none of
which can be perfectly insured against in financial markets. We allow for deviations
from efficiency in the annuities market and assess the impact of this both upon
portfolio allocation and upon the welfare characteristics of different pension systems.
There is now a large literature on portfolio allocation over the life cycle (see
Campbell et al (2001) for extensive references). We add to that by showing the impact
of imperfections in financial markets and the effects of social security in the form of
state, unfunded pensions with varying degrees of redistribution.
The comparison between funded and unfunded pension systems depends not just on
different risk sharing characteristics; it also depends upon demographic structure.
Any unfunded system that is in balance will need to levy a higher contribution rate
upon workers to give a certain level of benefits the higher is the old age dependency
ratio.  We look forward several decades and using information on the likely pattern of
life expectancy in the middle of this century we first construct an estimate of the
future steady-state population structure.  We use this (steady state) population
structure to work out what the required contribution rate would need to be to generate
unfunded pensions of various levels of generosity.   Given the level of unfunded
pensions, we then aim to calculate what the optimal savings and investment behavior
of cohorts of individuals would be.   This allows us to calculate macroeconomic
variables – the overall savings rate, the capital stock, levels of national income and so
on – which are generated by different pension arrangements.
In calculating the optimal behavior of individuals we take account of all the sources of
risk we noted above were essential.   In particular, we assume that individuals face
random, but persistent, shocks to labor income throughout their working life.   We
6also assume that they face uncertainty about the returns they will earn on at least some
sorts of financial assets.   We assume that there is a safe asset but there are also risky
assets which, on average, earn higher returns.   We also assume individuals are risk
averse and that they understand the risks of investing in different sorts of assets and
are also aware of the uncertainty over how long they will live.  We then use numerical
techniques to calculate optimal profiles of consumption, saving and portfolio
allocation for individuals over their lives. We aggregate these decisions to construct
the macroeconomic aggregates and also construct measures of welfare. Solving this
sort of model is difficult and we use numerical techniques to work out optimal paths.
We set the critical parameters in the model (parameters of the utility functions such as
degrees of risk aversion and rates of time preference, and characteristics of the labor
income profile over life) by reference to recent data from the Japanese economy.
We then simulate the model using different settings for the key policy variables.   We
also consider how differences in the investment environment, particularly the
efficiency of annuities contracts and the risk return trade-off on risky assets, affect the
economy.   We are able to show how different degrees of generosity of unfunded
pensions affects the overall saving rate, the level of steady-state national income, and
the allocation of savings across different assets.   We are also able to make welfare
comparisons.   We construct a measure of welfare by estimating the expected utility
of individuals born into a Japanese society whose population has settled down.   We
focus on the case where population is constant, which seems a relevant case given
trends in fertility and life expectancy (arguably it is the only reasonable steady state to
consider for a mature, developed country).
Our results indicate several things.
I. In steady state the capital stock, the level of national income and portfolio
allocation are extremely sensitive to differences in the generosity of unfunded
pensions.   The steady-state aggregate stock of wealth might be twice as high
if unfunded pensions were, on average, worth only 25 percent of average
earnings, as opposed to 50 percent.
II. How much of financial wealth is invested in risky assets is very sensitive to
both the level of state pensions and the efficiency of financial markets. Even
7with quite low risk aversion (a coefficient of relative aversion of 3) we can
explain substantial holdings of safe assets (between 40% and 60% of
portfolios) if state pensions are low. We do not need to assume extreme risk
aversion or fixed costs of investing in risky assets to generate substantial
investment in safe assets. This is so even though we use common assumptions
about risk premia and the volatility of risky assets.
III. The effects of reducing the generosity of unfunded pensions upon welfare,
savings, portfolio allocation and national income depend very much on the
efficiency of annuities contracts. They are also sensitive to the size of the
equity risk premium.
IV. Credit restrictions affect the answers substantially.   Individuals find it difficult
to borrow against future labor income (that is their human capital) and
therefore any model with uncertainty over income and over length of life is
one in which individuals naturally face borrowing constraints.    We find that
these constraints are likely to matter significantly.   We also find that how
serious borrowing constraints are, particularly amongst the elderly, depends
very much on the pension environment.
II.  The model:
We assume an economy where a given (large) number of agents are born each period
and where mortality rates (probabilities of surviving to given ages) are unchanging.
Such an economy will ultimately generate an unchanging demographic structure. We
focus on steady state population structures.
Given the stochastic processes for labor income and for rates of return (and
conditional on pensions arrangements and mortality rates) agents choose consumption
(and therefore saving) and portfolio allocation in each period to maximise expected
lifetime utility. We assume an additively separable form of the agent’s lifetime utility
function. We also assume a constant coefficient of risk aversion, the inverse of the
intertemporal substitution elasticity. Agents are assumed to know the probabilities of
surviving to given ages. Agent k who is aged j at time t maximises:
Uk   =   Et  [ 
å
-=
=
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i 0
sij { [ckt+i]
1- z  / (1- z  ) } / (1+r )i ] (1)
8where T is the maximum length of life possible (which we take as 120 years of age)
and the probability of surviving i more periods conditional on reaching age j is sij. (s0j
=1). r  is the rate of pure time preference; ckt+i is consumption of the agent in period
t+i.
z  is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
Agents face two constraints:
First there is a budget constraint governing the evolution of financial assets taken
from one period to the next.
Wk t+1  = [W k t + exp(ykt ).(1- t ) - ckt + b kt ].(l  exp(rst) + (1- l )exp(rft) ) (2)
W k t  is the stock of wealth of agent k in period t
ykt  is the log of gross labor income
t  is the tax rate on labor income. Tax paid is simply a proportion of gross income
b kt  is the level of the unfunded, state pension received by an agent, this pension is
zero until age 65.
l  is the proportion of financial assets invested in risky assets.
r st  is the one period (log) rate of return on risky financial assets between period t and
period t+1.
r ft is the one period (log) rate of return on safe financial assets between period t and
period t+1
For ease of notation we have not given agent-specific subscripts to asset returns but
we will allow for returns to depend on characteristics of the investor; because
probabilities of death are specific to agents of a given age rates of return on assets that
might have annuities features will be agent specific. We will describe how rates of
return on financial investments are determined shortly.
Agents also face a borrowing constraint; wealth cannot be negative:
W kt  ‡  0         for all k and t.
9This constraint may bind in various periods. Whether it does so depends in a complex
way upon the profile of the deterministic component of labor income, the realisations
of income and rate of return shocks, portfolio choices, the degree of risk aversion and
the volatility of shocks. It also depends on the tax rate and the generosity of state
pensions.
We also assume agents cannot take short positions in either safe or risky assets:
0 £  l  £  1
Agents work from age 20 to the end of their 64th year (if they survive that long) and
are retired thereafter. We assume that the profile of gross of tax labor income reflects
three factors. First, there is a time-related rise in general labor productivity. Second,
there is an age-related element to the growth of labor income over an agent’s life. This
is modelled as a quadratic in age.
The age-specific part of the log of labor income is:
a  + g age - q age2 (3)
We set g  and q  so that the age-income profile matches patterns that have been typical
(we discuss calibration issues in detail in the next section).
There is also an idiosyncratic (agent specific) stochastic element of labor income. The
log of labor income for an agent is the sum of the age-related element, the time related
element and the additive income shock. Denoting the log of gross labor income of
agent k who is aged j in period t as ykt we have:
ykt = a   +  gt + g .j - q .j
2 + ukt (4)
ukt  = f  ukt-1  + ekt
where  e ~ N(0, s e)
a  is a constant.
g is the rate of growth of labor productivity over time.
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f  reflects the degree of persistence in idiosyncratic shocks to labor income; empirical
evidence from a range of countries suggests f  is high and that idiosyncratic shocks to
income typically have a high degree of persistence.
We assume that rates of return on risky financial wealth vary across periods due to
random shocks that hit stock and bond markets. We assume that rates of return on
savings at a particular time - both on safe and risky assets - differ between individuals
because financial institutions take into account the probabilities of death of agents and
offer age-related investment products. More specifically, financial institutions offer
the following contracts. For every $ invested in period t, with a given risky/safe split,
the investor receives the market return adjusted for a probability of survival to the
next period. If markets are perfect the probability used in making this adjustment is
the true survival probability. But we allow for imperfections (stemming from adverse
selection or some other types of cost) which mean that the two are not equal. If the
agent dies the institution keeps the funds. With no bequest motives agents will always
chose these contracts over ones which just pay the market rate of return. If the
insurance element of this contract is offered on actuarially fair terms the ex-post rate
of return on a $ invested in the risky asset during period t by an agent k who is aged j
and who survives to the next period is given by:
exp( rst ) / s1j (5)
s1j  is the probability of surviving one more year conditional on reaching age j
We assume rs is the sum of the mean log return and an unpredictable shock.
rst =  r + vt
r  is the mean rate of return on risky assets
vt is the random element of the rate of return on assets in period t.
We assume v is iid and normal:    v ~ N(0, s r)
For a $ invested in the safe asset the return to an agent aged j is:
 exp(rf) / s1j (6)
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We assume that the distribution of returns on assets is itself unaffected by pension
arrangements; the most obvious justification for this is that there is a global capital
market where claims on safe and risky assets can be traded.
We can write the log returns on actuarially fair investments in risky and safe assets
respectively to an agent aged j at time t as:
  r + vt – ln(s1j ) (7)
  rf  – ln(s1j ) (8)
If markets are perfect this financial contract can be offered at no risk by financial
institutions because they pass on all the rate of return risk to investors and are
assumed to be able to take advantage of the law of large numbers and face no
uncertainty about the proportion of agents who will survive. It seems natural to
assume that financial firms will offer insurance against risks that are idiosyncratic
(individual length of life risk) but not offer insurance against systematic risk (rate of
return risk). The contracts offered by financial institutions can be thought of as highly
flexible individual retirement accounts (or personal pension schemes). Effectively
agents have their own pot of assets into which they pay contributions and make
deductions. Contribution rates and drawdowns from the fund are subject only to the
constraint that the pot of assets can never fall below zero. The average rates of return
on the fund increase with age since survival probabilities decline with age. Just as
standard flat annuities available for a given sum rise with age, so the average rate of
return offered by financial institutions increases with age.
In effect we are assuming that financial institutions offer one period annuities. These
are the vehicles through which agents save for retirement. Agents are able to draw
down such accounts in a flexible way in retirement. Individuals may decide to mimic
the payments from standard flat annuities by having the “pot” size (ie. W) decline
with age at a rate that is offset by rising average rates of return1.
                                                
1 A simple example shows how such assets can be used to mimic annuities. Suppose the probability of
death is invariant with respect to age and is at a constant rate p. Assume a non-stochastic, constant rate
of return rf. With an initial stock of wealth at retirement of W an agent could buy a standard annuity
12
To show how the one period contracts we assume are available allow agents to create
standard annuities – should they so wish – consider someone who just invests in the
safe asset (assumed to generate a constant return at rate rf). As before we focus on an
agent aged j at time t who has wealth W.
A standard, actuarially-fair annuity contract would promise to pay to a j year old an
annual amount of A (until death) in exchange for a lump sum of W, where A satisfies:
W = A [ 1 + s1j. e
-rf + s2j. e
-2rf + .............. + snj. e
-nrf ] n fi  ¥ (9)
Here we are assuming payments are made at the start of each period and the first
payment is made immediately. Let:
D  ”  [ 1 + s1j. e
-rf + s2j. e
-2rf + .............. + snj. e
-nrf ] n fi  ¥ (10)
So         A = W / D
Note the link between one period survival probabilities at different ages:
s2j = s1j s1j+1
and more generally:
snj = s1j s1j+1  s1j+2 ........... s1j+n-1 (11)
If a j year old agent has wealth W in a fund and withdraws an amount A= W/f  and
reinvests the remainder with our one-period contracts, their wealth at the start of the
next peirod is:
W[ 1 – 1/D  ] erf / s1j
                                                                                                                                           
from a firm offering an actuarially fair deal which pays  W(rf+p)/(1+rf) each period until death. We
assume here that the first of these level payments is made immediately and then come at the start of
each subsequent period so long as the agent is alive. One period savings contracts of the sort we
envisage pay a return per dollar invested of (1+rf)/(1-p) if the agent survives and nothing otherwise. An
agent starting with wealth of W could immediately take W(rf+p)/(1+rf) out and reinvest the rest for one
period. If they survive their wealth at the start of the next period is :   W [ 1 – (rf+p)/(1+rf) ].{(1+rf)/(1-
p)} = W. Obviously this policy can be sustained indefinitely. Thus the standard annuity contract can be
replicated exactly by rolling forward one period contracts.
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Withdrawing the same amount in the second period, when the agent is aged j+1,
generates a fund at the start of the third period of:
W[{(1 – 1/D ). erf /s1j - 1/ D }. e
rf / s1j+1 ] = W[(1 – 1/D ) e
2rf /s2j – (1/D ) e
rf /s1j+1]
Assuming a constant per period withdrawal rate of W/f  the level of funds at the start
of period n+1 is:
   W[ (1 – 1/D ) enrf /snj  -  (1/D ){ e
(n-1)rf /sn-1 j+1   +  e
(n-2)rf /sn-2 j+2   +  e
(n-3)rf /sn-3 j+3 +
............…...............  +  erf /s1 j+n-1 } ] (12)
Which we can write:
W(enrf /snj) [1 – (1/D ).{1 + s1j. e
-rf  +  s2j. e
-2rf  + .............  +  sn-1 j. e
-(n-1)rf }] (13)
From (10) we have that for finite n
0  <  (1/D ).{1 + s1j. e
-rf  +  s2j. e
-2rf  + ............. + sn-1 j. e
-(n-1)rf }  <  1
So (13) is always positive. This proves that the one period annuity contracts allow
agents to mimic the returns from standard (open-ended) annuity contracts and satisfy
budget constraints.
By assuming the availability of one period annuity contracts we are giving agents
more options on lifetime accumulation and decumulation of assets than with standard
annuities or with standard retirement accounts. Agents will value flexibility in
annuitising and are unlikely to want a flat drawdown of their accumulated fund. The
optimal rate of accumulation and decumulation of funds over time is a complicated
function of all the parameters in the model and depends on the realisation of shocks; it
can only be ascertained by simulations.
But in assuming that agents are offered these savings vehicles on actuarially fair terms
we would be making a strong assumption that factors that seem to be important in the
real world, and that make rates of return implicit in annuities contracts tend to be less
than actuarially fair, are absent. (See, for example, Friedman and Warshawsky (1988);
Mitchell, Poterba and Warshawsky (1997) and Brown, Mitchell and Poterba (1999)).
14
It is important to allow for problems that make annuities less than fair. We introduce a
measure of the efficiency of annuities markets. When this measure, b  , is 1 the
annuities market work perfectly. When b  = 0 annuities are, effectively, not offered.
The survival probability implicit in the contract offered by a financial institution is a
weighted average of the true survival probability, s1j , and the rate when no annuity is
offered, an effective survival probability of unity. b  is the weight placed on the
actuarially fair survival probability
The rate of return paid on one period savings invested with l  in the risky asset and (1-
l ) in the safe asset for an agent aged j at time t becomes:
{l exp[r + vt] + (1- l )exp[rf] } / [b s1j + (1-b )] (14)
This way of modeling the efficiency of annuity contracts allows the departure from
actuarially fair contracts to vary with age. The greater is age, the lower the probability
of surviving and for all b  < 1 the greater is the departure from actuarially fair
contracts. Recent empirical evidence from the US suggests that annuity rates do
become increasingly less favorable with age. Mitchell, Poterba and Warshawsky
(1997) estimate that the average US annuity in 1995 delivered payouts with expected
present value of between 80% and 85% of each $ annuity premium for 65 year olds;
but the payout ratio was less for older people. A payout ratio of 80% of the actuarially
fair value for a 65 year old corresponds in our simulations (based on projected future
Japanese mortality rates2) to a value of b  of about  0.3 if the rate of return on assets is
a flat 6%. Friedman and Warshawsky (1988) report US payout ratios from the 1970’s
and 1980’s of around 75% which corresponds to a b  for a Japanese economy with
2050 life expectancies of about 0.2. Brown, Mitchell and Poterba (1999) provide
some evidence that in the UK annuities average about 90% of the actuarially fair
rates. This corresponds to a b  of around 0.55.  In both the US and the UK there is
strong evidence of substantial variability in annuity rates across companies. In our
simulations we consider 3 values for b : 1 (perfect annuities); 0.5 ("semi-perfect"
annuities which represent a payout of about 89% of "fair" value); and  b  = 0 ( no
annuities).
15
State pensions
In the case we consider first the state pays a flat rate pension to all retired people. The
system is financed by the proportional tax on labor income levied on all those
working. In steady state the demographic structure is stable so the ratio of workers to
pensioners is constant and is determined by the predicted Japanese survival survival
probabilities for 2050. Since we assume all shocks to labor income are idiosyncratic,
and are independent of the rate of return shocks, there is no uncertainty about the
aggregate wage bill or about aggregate tax revenue. The tax rate is set to balance the
unfunded state pension system in every period. We define the replacement rate of the
state pension as the ratio between the pension paid in period t and the average gross
income of those in the last year of their working life at period t-1. For a given
replacement rate there is a constant tax rate which balances the system and allows the
state pension to rise at the rate of aggregate labor productivity growth (g). Thus
pensioners continue to benefit from aggregate labor productivity growth after leaving
the work force. In this simple, constant population model the average (across all
agents) implicit rate of return on contributions made to the unfunded (PAYGO)
system is g.
The tax rate to finance state pensions of a given generosity is proportional to the
replacement rate of the unfunded system. The factor of proportionality reflects the
support ratio which in turn reflects mortality rates and life expectancy. We use data on
anticipated Japanese mortality rates in 2050. For males these imply a life expectancy
at birth of around 80; for women the figure is around 84.  We take the average
mortality rates across males and females to construct our survival probabilities. Using
the figures the conditional life expectancy at different ages is shown in figure 1 and
the attrition rate of pensioners from age 65 is shown in figure 2. In each figure we
compare predicted (2050) mortality profiles with current (1999) Japanese life
expectancies.
The steady state population structure of adults is easily calculated from the one period
survival probabilities given in the predicted 2050 life tables. Given the life table data
                                                                                                                                           
2 using projected Japanese mortality rates for 2050.
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we use, the steady state Japanese support ratio (the ratio between those aged 20 to 64
to those aged 65 and more) is around 2.8.  This is substantially lower than the current
Japanese support ratio which is almost 3.7. But the predicted steady state support ratio
is much higher than that predicted for 2050 if very low fertility rates persist in Japan;
that ratio could be under 2. Figure 3 illustrates the difference between steady state
demographics and predictions for Japanese demographic structure for 2050 based on
low fertility and a rapidly declining population.
We have defined the replacement rate as the ratio between the pension of a just retired
person and the average gross income of those in their last year of work. We assume
pension income is untaxed. The equilibrium tax rates for different gross (and net)
replacement rates are shown in table 1.
III.  Solving the Model:
The set of first order conditions from individual k’s optimisation problem are:
if       ckt < [W kt + exp(ykt).(1- t ) + bkt ]
then (15)
U`(ckt ) = Et [s1j { U`[ckt+i].{ l  exp(r +vt) + (1- l )exp(rft) }/ [b s1j + (1- b )] } / (1+r )]
else:
ckt   =  [W kt + exp(ykt ).(1- t ) + bkt ]
and (16)
U`(ckt ) ‡  Et [s1j { U`[ckt+i]. { l  exp(r +vt) + (1- l )exp(rft) } / [b s1j + (1-b )]  } / (1+r )]
where  U`(ckt )  is   ¶ Uk  / ¶ ckt
We also require a condition for optimal portfolio allocation:
Either :
0 = Et [ U`[ckt+i].{ exp(r +vt) - exp(rft) } ]
and 0 £  l  £  1
or
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0 < Et [ U`[ckt+i].{ exp(r +vt) - exp(rft) } ]
and  l  = 1 (17)
else
0 > Et [ U`[ckt+i].{ exp(r +vt) - exp(rft) } ]
and l  = 0.
(15) holds when the borrowing constraint is not binding. When the constraint binds
complementary slackness implies that (16) holds. (17) is a standard condition for
optimal portfolio allocation. Corner solutions may arise where agents wish to only
invest in the safe asset or in the risky asset; for an internal solution the first equality at
(17) must hold.
Although characterising optimal plans is easy enough solving explicitly for optimal
consumption and for the optimal accumulation path for funds is not possible. Instead
we have to turn to numerical methods. We solve the problem backwards in a now
standard way (see Deaton (1990), Zeldes (1989) and Skinner, Hubbard and
Zeldes(1995)). The resources available for consumption in any period are what
Deaton calls cash in hand (given the borrowing constraint this is an upper limit on
consumption). Cash in hand at time t for agent k is given by
[W kt + exp(ykt ).(1- t ) + bkt ] (18)
In the final possible period that an agent could survive to (age 120) consumption of all
resources is optimal since we assume no bequest motive. We take a set of possible
values for cash in hand available in the penultimate period to when the agent might be
alive. For each of those values we solve a constrained optimisation problem. We seek
a value of consumption and a portfolio choice value (l ) to satisfy the first order
conditions (15) or (16) and (17) given the current state variable (cash in hand). We
first solve (17) for given levels of saving to find l , relying on the fact that
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consumption in the final period equals whatever cash in hand then is. Final period
consumption will depend on the realization of vT  if any of the risky asset is held.
Numerical integration can be used to estimate the RHS of (17) for any value of l  and
a root finding algorithm then solves for the l  that satisfies the first order condition.
With l  determined for various levels of consumption (or equivalently saving) we
proceed to calculate the right hand side of (15) for a given level of consumption today
at today’s cash in hand. The right hand side of (15) is the expected product of
marginal utility in the next period and the rate of return (adjusted for probabilities of
death and for the rate of pure time preference). To do this calculation we need to
consider the probability distribution of different values for cash in hand tomorrow and
estimate what optimal consumption (and so marginal utility) will be at each
realisation of cash in hand tomorrow. In general this involves integrating in two
dimensions because there are two random components – a shock to rates of return and
to labor income. (In fact after age 65 labor income is zero so then there is only one
source of uncertainty). In the final period all cash in hand is consumed so finding the
optimal level of consumption in the penultimate period – the value that solves the first
order conditions – is relatively easy. We use the constrained optimisation routine in
GAUSS to solve this problem.
Now we have a set of estimated values for optimal consumption and portfolio
allocation at a finite set of cash in hand values in the penultimate period. We proceed
to the second from last possible period and consider another set of possible cash in
hand values. At each cash in hand value we again seek a level of consumption and
portfolio allocation which satisfies the first order condition. To estimate what optimal
consumption in the next period would be for a given a realisation for cash in hand we
use the solved values at the finite set of cash in hand points for the penultimate period
and interpolate between them.
We proceed backwards in this way storing solved values for optimal consumption and
portfolio allocations for a given set of cash in hand values at each age. During the
period of work there is another state variable - besides age and cash in hand - which is
current income. Because income shocks are persistent we need to keep track of
current income; this makes the problem much more computationally burdensome for
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the work years. We expand the dimension of the grid and solve the problem at
combinations of age, cash in hand and income levels.
We continue back to the first period. At that stage we have a complete grid of optimal
consumption and portfolio shares at various cash in hand values and income levels for
every age an agent might reach.
What makes the process intensive of computer time is the need to perform many
evaluations of the expected value of the product of marginal utility and the random
rate of return. At each cash in hand value and at each income level we need to work
out this expectation at each age and for many possible values of current consumption
and portfolio choice until we find one that satisfies the first order conditions.
We use 10 point Gauss Hermite numerical integration which is the natural choice with
normally distributed errors. With two sources of uncertainty this requires 100 function
evaluations for the calculation of each numerical integral (at least until we reach
retirement when integration in a single variable is sufficient). Each of these 100
evaluations requires 2-dimensional interpolation using the cash in hand / consumption
pairs and portfolio shares/cash in hand pairs from the estimated solution grid in the
next period.
A good deal of trial and error is needed to find the size of the grid that is required to
get accurate solutions. We found that a grid that was fine at relatively low levels of
cash in hand (regions where agents spend a good deal of time fairly early in life and
when constraints are often binding) and becomes much coarser at high cash in hand
values worked well. We found that 80 values for cash in hand were required to get
accurate solutions. (Solutions were checked using simulations with large numbers of
agents to ensure that first order conditions held).
Once we have a grid of vales for a given set of parameters running simulations is
relatively easy. We draw 7000 paths of normally distributed random shocks to
incomes and to rates of return over a life that could last until age 120. For each of the
7000 individuals (or sample lives) we use the first element of their vector of shocks to
log income to calculate initial period income. For each agent we then use the
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calculated grids of optimal consumption and portfolio share values for various initial
values of cash in hand and the income shock to estimate optimal first period
consumption and optimal portfolio allocation. This involves 2 dimensional
interpolating between the cash in hand and income shock points on the grid. Since the
relations between cash in hand and both optimal consumption and portfolio allocation,
and between the income shock and those choice variables, is smooth the interpolation
does not pose any problems.
We now have a set of initial values for consumption from which we calculate saving
and apply the portfolio shares to generate holdings of safe and risky assets. Second
period wealth for each agent is initial saving multiplied by the portfolio rate of return
which depends upon the random rate of return and the safe rate (both adjusted for the
common survival probability). We then take another draw for the random income
shock using a random number generator and, given the persistence parameter in the
income process, generate a new realisation for income. After deducting tax we have
second period net labor income which is added to the realised value for financial
wealth (which depends on the shock to rates of return) to give second period cash in
hand. We then use the grid solutions to calculate consumption and portfolio allocation
at these new cash in hand values. The simulation proceeds in this manner.
What we end up with is 7000 profiles of consumption. Each profile shows what
consumption and wealth holdings would have been for each agent facing a particular
set of shocks and if they survived until the longest possible age. From this set of
profiles we calculate expected utility of someone about to start their life. This
calculation is straightforward and proceeds in stages. First at each age we calculate
utility for the 7000 agents given their consumption. Second we average these utilities
across the 7000 agents at each age. Third we take a weighted sum of these period
averages using the overall discount factors as perceived at age 20 as weights. Thus the
weight on the average utility for age 90 is the probability of surviving to age 90,
conditional on a current age of 20, multiplied by a factor of 1/ (1+r )90  , which is a
fairly small number. The weights attached to future average utilities (conditional on
living) fall away very fast after age 90
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IV.  Calibration
We set the discount rate equal to -1.5% and the coefficient of relative risk aversion (z )
equal to 3, which implies an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 0.33. In the
absence of bequests, in our model a negative discount rate is needed to generate the
level of savings observed in Japan. A negative discount rate is not inconsistent with
positive equilibrium real rates of return, see Benninga (1990), and Kocherlakota
(1990). Other researchers have used a negative rate of pure time preference to model
Japanese household decisions. Kato (1998) calibrates an OLG model to the Japanese
economy with a  -7.5% discount rate and Kato (2000) uses the rate of -3.5%.
Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu and Joines (1999a) use a negative discount rate of just over
1% in their numerical simulations based on US data. The empirical work of Hurd
(1989) is consistent with small negative rates of pure time preference (for the US).
The intertemporal elasticity of substitution is controversial; Cooley and Prescott
(1995) use unity for their simulations whereas Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) use a
coefficient of relative risk aversion of 4, implying the elasticity is only 0.25.
Empirical work by Hansen and Singleton (1983) and Mankiw, Rotemberg and
Summers (1985) suggest values a little over unity for intertemporal substitutability
suggesting, in our framework, a coefficient of relative risk aversion a little under
unity. Grossman and Shiller (1981), Mankiw (1985) and Hall (1980) found values
between 0 and 0.4. for the intertemporal elasticity suggesting coefficients of risk
aversion well in excess of 2. Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1995) use a relative risk
aversion of 3 in their simulations. Zeldes (1989) estimated the risk aversion
coefficient as 2.3. Kato (1998) and Kato (2000) report relative risk aversion of 5 and
2.22 . We consider a value of 3 for the risk aversion coefficient is a central estimate
but clearly the evidence makes it hard to be confident about what a plausible figure is.
Income profile
Cross section profiles of Japanese incomes suggest that it is typical for earnings to
peak at around age 50 when average earnings are around double the earnings of new
workers (20 year olds)3. We set the parameters of the earnings process so that on
average the income of Japanese workers peaks at the age of 50 when it is double
                                                
3 Japanese Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, "Basic Survey on Wage Structure" (2000).
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earnings at age 20. With productivity growth at 2% this leads to the following average
income profile
yt = ln2  - (ln2)/900*(age-50)^2 + 0.02t.
Figure 6 shows the resulting pattern of labor income over the life cycle where there is
2% general labor productivity growth and for an agent who experiences no income
shocks (ekt = 0 for all t); here we set the state pension at 50% of gross pre-retirement
average earnings (or at about 65% of net earnings). Pensions grow in line with
aggregate labor productivity.
Income volatility
Setting the volatility of the shock to labor income is particularly important for the
simulations. As noted above, a significant part of the shocks to individual incomes
appear to be persistent. Our strategy is to set the variance of the iid shocks so as to
generate an overall degree of income uncertainty which is typical, while keeping the
persistence of shocks comparable to that of other studies. Hubbard, Skinner and
Zeldes (1995) use a model of income dynamics to simulate the impact of social
security which is based on characteristics of US household income data. Their model
is similar to that used here except that they allow for both transitory and persistent
shocks, while we only allow for persistent shocks. Their model for the log income of
household k at time t is:
ykt  =  f(agekt)  +  ukt   +  wkt 
ukt  =  f  ukt-1   + ekt
where e and w are iid shocks that are not correlated and f(agekt) is a deterministic
function.
A measure of the unconditional volatility of log income is:
s
2
w  +  s
2
e  / (1 - f
2)
Typical values for f , s w  and s v used by Hubbard et al are 0.955, 0.158 and 0.158.
These imply that some income shocks are highly persistent. With these values their
measure of the unconditional standard deviation of the shock to log income  is 0.564.
                                                
4 In fact Hubbard et al set different values of r , s w  and s v for those with no high school, high school
and College education. The implied unconditional standard deviation of the shocks to log income for
these three groups are 0.64, 0.51 and 0.44 respectively.
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The dispersion of Japanese wages is lower than in the US. We find that setting the
unconditional standard deviation of shocks to log income between 0.4 and 0.5 for the
Japanese workforce matches the empirical distribution quite well.  Figure 4, for
example, illustrates that with an unconditional standard deviation of 0.45 the implied
distribution of the levels of income is very close to the actual 1996 distribution of
Japanese household income. (For this comparison we adjust the intercept in our
process for log income to match the mean of Japanese household income in 1996).
Part of the inequality in the empirical distribution reflects the life cycle pattern of
earning rather than the impact of persistent shocks to earnings or persistent
differences in earnings power. To allow for this we assume an unconditional standard
deviation of log income a little lower at 0.40. We set the persistence parameter at 0.95
implying a standard deviation of the random (iid) income shocks of around 0.125. (In
terms of parameters in Hubbard et al we set f  = 0.95, s w = 0 and s e = 0.125.)
Returns
The historical real returns on the NIKKEI 225 index over the past few decades have a
mean of 7-8% with standard deviation of 22-25% depending on what period one
considers (1960-2000, 1970-2000 or 1980-2000). These figures are for gross returns;
net of charges annual returns to individuals are likely to be lower by at least 50 basis
points, and perhaps by more.
.
Bond portfolios are less volatile. Miles and Timermann (1999) suggest that a mixed
bond and stock portfolio in developed countries would have generated a lower
average real return than an equity portfolio and with a significantly lower annual
volatility. In Japan such a mixed portfolio might generate an average real return of
about 6% a year with annual standard deviations of around 17.5%. Stock returns with
these characteristics have been typical in many developed countries in the past. The
above figures are before any deductions for charges, for this reason we think of net
returns on risky assets with means of 6% and volatility of 17.5% as relatively
optimistic. We also consider a case with mean return 4% and volatility 17.5%.
Feldstein and Ranguelova (2000) use a return for US risky assets with a mean annual
return of 5.5% and a standard deviation of 17.5%
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We set the risk-free rate at 2% making it equal to the productivity growth in our
model.
Simulation with current survival rates:
Before considering in detail the results using projected steady state population
structure based on 2050 life expectancies we first describe results of a simulation
assuming that the Japanese population has stabilised at a level consistent with current
survival rates (see Figure 5). This generates a support ratio 3.09 as opposed to the
current support ratio of about 3.65. Guided by the historical distribution of NIKKEI
225 returns we set the mean return on risky assets at 8% and standard deviation at
25%.  (We consider this too high a figure for future returns; for future steady state
simulations we set the mean return on risky assets as either 6% or 4% and the
standard deviation at 17.5%)  The pension generosity is set at the current level (1999)
in Japan which is about 50% (65% on a net of tax basis). Annuities are taken to be
semi-perfect (b =0.5). This implies a money's worth ratio of slightly under 90%. All
other parameters are set at levels described in previous section. This first simulation is
designed to see if broad features of recent Japanese performance can be reproduced.
The implied average income profile is depicted in Figure 6.
We simulate random income shocks for 7000 individuals and calculate the
corresponding optimal consumption-investment paths. In this illustrative simulation
the number of credit constrained individuals is about 38% of  20 year olds, decreasing
to virtually zero amongst those aged 50. The proportion credit constrained starts
picking up again at retirement; half of those who survive to age 94, and nearly 80% of
the small number who live beyond 100, are constrained. (See Figure 7).
Household assets start at zero. On average assets increase steadily until retirement
when they typically represent 7.5 years of annual income of the age group 60-64 (see
Figure 8). Savings rate mirror the accumulation and decumulation of assets. Young
people under 30 on average save less than 10% of income whereas people aged 44 to
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64 save (on average) more than 20%. With declining life expectancy, pensioners
dissave most around age 85 (-25%), see also Figure 9.
Based on current mortality rates and with state pensions worth 50% of average (gross)
final salary (65% of net) the aggregate wealth to national income ratio in steady state
is 3.49, the labor share of national income is 74.7% and the aggregate saving rate is
10%.  All these figures are net of depreciation. In aggregate 87% of wealth is invested
in the risky asset. The life cycle evolution of risky investment is shown in Figure 10.
Note that we set the distribution of rates of return independently of saving and wealth
accumulation in Japan; we consistently assume Japan is integrated with the world
capital market and although a large economy it is assumed not to influence global
capital market returns.
V.  Results for future steady states with different pension arrangements:
We show results for various combinations of assumptions about the distribution of
rates of return, annuity market efficiency and the structure of state pension
arrangements. We begin with the case where the state pays flat rate pensions. Tables 2
to 7 summarise the results. One thing stands out immediately from the tables: the
equilibrium stock of wealth, and the wealth to national income ratio, is highly
sensitive to the generosity of unfunded, state pensions.  When state pensions are
worth 20% of (end -of -working-life) average gross incomes the aggregate stock of
wealth is around twice the level when pensions are set to generate an average
replacement rate of 50%. The wealth to national income ratios are somewhat less
variable since with wealth so much higher when pensions are lower national income
is also greater and the wealth to income ratio rises slightly less than the aggregate
stock of wealth.  A second general feature of the results is that with less generous
state pensions a significantly higher proportion of wealth is invested in safe, rather
than risky, assets. The scale of the difference depends upon how effective annuities
contracts are and on the risk premium on risky assets, but the effect is never small.
With a 4% risk premium (an average rate of return on risky assets of 6% and a 2%
safe rate) and perfect annuities markets the share of wealth in risky assets falls from
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94% with a replacement rate of 50% on flat-rate, state pensions to 60% if there are no
unfunded pensions. The scale of the switch is even larger with less efficient annuities
markets and is also greater with a lower risk premium. When the average return on
risky assets is only 4%, and with no state pensions, only just under 40% of aggregate
wealth is held in risky assets; that proportion rises to 85% or more if state pensions
generate an average replacement rate of 50%. (See tables 5-7). Flat-rate state pensions
are risk free so the more generous they are the more willing people are to take risks
with their savings - but with no state pensions the retired are much less willing to
invest a very high proportion of retirement savings in risky assets. The results suggest
that there is a powerful link between the generosity of state, unfunded pensions that
are independent of asset market risk and portfolios of wealth held by households.
Tables 2 to 4 summarise the results for a 6% average annual rate of return on risky
assets with a standard deviation of 17.5%. If financial markets offer actuarially fair
contracts (perfect annuity markets) steady state expected utility is maximised when
there are no unfunded state pensions. The final row in the table (“equivalent prod.
gain”) shows by how much average labor income in a world with no state pensions
would have to be different so as to generate the same expected utility as in a world
with unfunded pensions of a given generosity. If state pensions were set at a low rate,
such that someone with average income at the end of their working life only got a
state  pension at age 65 of 20% of their last labor income, expected lifetime utility
would be significantly lower than with no pensions. Table 2 shows that this would
reduce utility by the equivalent of a 2.4% cut in labor incomes. Higher state pensions
further reduce expected utility: state pensions with an average replacement rate of
50% of gross income (around 65% on a net income basis) reduce welfare by the
equivalent of a 10.4% permanent reduction in productivity. With perfectly efficient
annuities contracts and a substantially higher return on risky assets than the growth in
productivity (which equals the effective return on contributions to the state pension
system) individuals would prefer to accumulate savings in their own retirement fund
rather than rely significantly on state, unfunded schemes. They respond to lower
contributions to the state pension and lower state pensions by saving substantially
more. With no state pensions the stock of aggregate wealth is 738 and the wealth to
national income ratio is about 7.5. The aggregate saving rate is about 16%. With 40%
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safety net pensions the stock of wealth is 350 , the wealth to income ratio is 4.12 and
the national saving rate is only just over 10%.
But if annuities are not available (b =0) then not only are agents much less well off but
there is a welfare enhancing role for state (flat rate) pensions, even if the rate of return
on risky assets (with a mean of 6%) is, on average, three times the implicit rate of
return on contributions to unfunded pensions (2%). Table 4 shows that a flat rate,
unfunded pension which generates a 20% replacement rate at retirement increases
expected utility, relative to a world with no state pensions, by the equivalent of a 4.4%
increase in labor productivity at all ages. Once again it also generates a very much
smaller stock of aggregate assets than if no state pensions were paid: aggregate wealth
is 915 with no pension, 566 with a 20% gross average replacement rate and 250 with
a 50% replacement rate.
But even with completely inefficient annuities markets when the risk premium is 4%
steady state expected utility is maximised with fairly small state pensions. If the
replacement rate on the state unfunded pensions rises above 20% expected steady
state welfare starts to fall. Table 3 shows that if annuities markets are semi-perfect
(b =0.5) even state pensions generating a replacement rate of only 20% reduce welfare
slightly relative to a situation with no state pensions.
But with a lower risk premium of only 2% there is a greater role for state pensions.
Even if annuities markets are semi-perfect welfare is significantly higher with state
pensions worth 20% of average gross final salaries than when there are no state
pensions; welfare is higher by the equivalent of a 2% permanent gain in productivity.
(See table 6).
With no state pensions agents would never chose to run down assets in retirement to
zero, regardless of the efficiency of one period annuity contracts. But with 40%
replacement rate state pensions a significant proportion of those who live longer than
average would optimally run out of private savings. Table 8 shows the proportion of
those of various ages who would chose to consume all their cash in hand (and are
therefore credit constrained) at various ages and assuming various degrees of
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efficiency in annuities markets. Whatever the efficiency of annuity markets a
substantial proportion of agents are credit constrained very early in life. The less
perfect are annuity markets, the more people are credit constrained as they get older.
With no state pensions people never run out of savings as they age (though there
remain substantial numbers of credit constrained among the young). With a 6%
average rate of return and pensions worth 40% of average income at retirement about
15% of those who survived to age 90 would become credit constrained if b  = 0.5. If
pensions are worth 20% this proportion falls to almost zero. With a lower rate of
return the proportion credit constrained is somewhat higher.
The pattern of average savings rates over the life cycle with different generosities of
flat rate state pensions, and various degrees of efficiency of annuity contracts, is
interesting. The profile of saving at the start of working life displays a pattern typical
when precautionary motives are important and where income uncertainty is
significant. In the first few periods in work most agents save a substantial fraction of
wealth to establish a small stock of assets as a buffer to protect consumption against
future labor income shocks. On average agents then dissave mildly for several years
before starting to build up a stock of assets for retirement. When savings starts to
become significant, and how great the stock of wealth at retirement is, are sensitive to
both the generosity of state pensions and to the efficiency of annuity markets. With no
state pensions and perfect annuity markets saving typically becomes significant from
the mid 20’s. With a state pension worth 40% of average labor income at retirement
and completely imperfect annuity markets savings is typically not significant (after
the initial establishment of a precautionary buffer at the start of work) until the 30’s.
An alternative state pension system:
So far we have considered flat rate state pensions. These are highly redistributive and
provide the greatest insurance against idiosyncratic labor income risk, but they come
at a possible cost of labor supply distortions. How are the results different with state
pensions that are related to income during the working life? We consider a state
pension system which generates a given replacement rate for each individual, rather
than generates an average replacement rate of a given level. This system makes
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pensions proportional to final salary and is therefore not redistributive. It also
provides no insurance against shocks to labor income which are still having an effect
on final period salaries. Given the highly persistent nature of income shocks, if state
pensions are proportional to final salary they pass on much of the impact of income
uncertainty from the working years into retirement income.
Tables 9 and 10 summarises the results of simulations where we have unfunded
pensions linked to final salaries. We focus on a 6% expected return on risky assets
and analyze "semi-perfect" annuities (b  = 0.5) and no annuities ((b  = 0.5). It is natural
to compare the salary-related pensions outcomes to those where pensions are paid at a
flat rate (but with the same average generosity). Comparing the results in table 9 with
those in table 3, and he results in table 10 with those in table 4, reveals four things:
1. With pensions linked to final salary agents face more idiosyncratic risk and they
respond by investing slightly less of their wealth in risky assets. This reflects the
well-known finding that more background risk reduces holding of risky assets,
even if the risk is uncorrelated with returns on risky assets.
2. Agents also typically save rather more when pensions are less certain. With
pensions worth 40% of final salary the aggregate stock of assets is about 16%
higher than with flat rate pensions of the same average value. When the
replacement rate is 50% the stock of wealth is about 19% higher with income-
related pensions.
3. When viewed from the beginning of life - and from behind a veil of ignorance
since first period income is not known -  agents would strictly prefer flat rate
pensions at the end of their lives. This is obvious because risk averse individuals
will prefer pensions that offer insurance against bad draws of income while giving
the same average value of benefits. But we do not attach much significance to the
scale of the gap between expected lifetime utility in Tables 3 and 9. This is
because we assume fixed labor supply so that any benefits of linking unfunded
pensions to contributions (an implication of having pensions proportional to final
salary) are assumed away. In a richer model with endogenous labor market effort
the gains from smaller distortions to labor supply would need to be counted.
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4. When annuities markets are semi-perfect (money's worth rations about 89%) there
is no welfare enhancing roles for state, unfunded pensions. Only when annuities
markets work poorly do unfunded pensions enhance welfare and even then only
small pensions are warranted; when the replacement rate on state pensions moves
above 20% welfare starts to fall sharply.
VI.  Conclusions:
Two factors emerge as important to the design of pension systems with an optimal
degree of reliance on personal retirement accounts relative to unfunded pensions.
First, the nature of the distribution of rates of return. Second, how efficient are
annuities contracts. The optimal size of unfunded pensions is sensitive to both factors.
If average rates of return on risky assets are as high as 6% then even if volatility in
returns is high (17.5% annual standard deviation) and annuity markets less than
perfect (b  = 0.5) there is no useful role for unfunded pensions. Only if annuities are
absent altogether does the existence of any unfunded pensions generate higher steady
state welfare. If rates of return on risky assets have a lower mean the situation is
different. With 4% mean returns on risky assets then with semi-perfect annuity
markets unfunded safety net pensions worth about 20% of average gross labor income
at retirement are optimal. But with perfect annuity markets (b =1) there is still no
welfare-enhancing role for unfunded state pensions.
One significant feature of the results is the sensitivity of portfolio allocation to the
existence of state, unfunded pensions and, to a lesser extent, to the efficiency of
annuity markets. With relatively generous unfunded pensions linked either to average
wages or to individual earnings histories agents invest the great majority of their
savings in risky assets. But when resources for retirement come largely from
accumulated savings a substantial part (as much as 60% in some cases) is invested in
safe assets. This dependence of investment patterns on the generosity of state
pensions has been paid much less attention than the link between the amount of
private saving and state pensions.  Our results suggest this is very important.
We have assumed that rates of return are independently (and identically) distributed
over time. This means that investment risk can, to a significant extent, be smoothed
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over time. There is evidence that rates of return are not independent over time; mean
reversion at long horizons may exist (Poterba and Summers (1988)). This can have an
important impact on the risk of funded pensions where investment horizons of thirty
or more years is relevant. It can also mean that the iid assumption can underestimate
the risk of funded pensions (see Miles and Timermann (1999) for illustrative
calculations). An important area for future work is the modeling of optimal pension
arrangements when asset markets are subject to sustained periods of above or below
average returns; if there are bull and bear markets funded pensions are likely to be
riskier than if returns come from the same distribution each period.
A key policy implication in this paper is that governments need to carefully consider
the efficiency of annuity contracts before embarking on pension reform. The results
reported here suggest that how efficient annuity contracts are, why deviations from
actuarially fair contracts might exist, and how reform might change this are crucial.
However we do not model the reasons why annuity contracts might be less than fair
and to understand the policy implications of imperfections knowing why they exist is
obviously important.  But we can measure the welfare gains from making annuity
contracts more efficient, and they are substantial. Table 11 shows the equivalent
permanent increase in labor incomes which generates the same welfare gain as a
given increase in the efficiency, or degree of actuarial fairness, of financial contracts.
In each case we consider the gain which arises when b  increases from 0.5 (semi-
perfect annuity contracts) to1 (perfect contracts). The gain from this change is the
equivalent of a permanent rise in productivity of between 3.5% and 4.5% of
productivity when there are no state pensions. Those gains are smaller the greater is
the generosity of unfunded pensions, though they are not trivial.
The results suggest that understanding why annuity contracts may not be actuarially
fair is a major policy question.
By focusing on long run implications of demographic changes, and on the
implications of different pension arrangements, we are, of course, abstracting from
transitional issues.   While we are able to say something about how different steady
states look, that does not in itself give an unambiguous guide to policy.   For example,
by simply looking at steady states one might conclude that unfunded pensions should
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be substantially reduced and that a situation where individuals rely almost completely
on funded pensions would be desirable.   But given the existing generosity of
unfunded pensions in most developed countries one faces a formidable problem in
moving from the current situation to a largely funded system, and one would have to
take account of existing obligations to pay pensions to those in or near retirement.
The value of the kind of simulations we report in our research is that it nonetheless
can tell us something about what the implications of making a particular transition
are.   For example, if it were to be the case that the long run benefits of reducing
unfunded pensions and building up funded pension assets were to be very substantial,
then that benefit would be weighed against the transitional costs.   On the other hand,
if it would be desirable even in a steady state to preserve very substantial levels of
unfunded pensions (for example because of their desirable risk sharing characteristics)
then it might not be worth undertaking any sort of transition to a funded system given
that there are costs in moving there anyway.   For these reasons we believe the sort of
steady state analysis we undertake are a critical element of any assessment of optimal
responses to demographic change.
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Table 1
Steady State Replacement Rates and Contribution Rates to State, Unfunded Pension
System (%)
Gross replacement rate§ 5 10 20 30 40 50
Net replacement rate¤ 5.1 10.5 21.9 34.5 48.4 63.9
Balanced contribution rate“ 2.18 4.36 8.72 13.1 17.44 21.8
Note: Figures are based on a system in balance with a population structure implied by anticipated
Japanese 2050 mortality rates and assuming a constant population.
§  ratio  of age 65 pension to average gross earnings of age 64 agents one period earlier
¤  ratio  of age 65 pension to average net earnings of age 64 agents one period earlier
“  contribution rate to balance unfunded, state pension scheme
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Table 2:   Mean return on risky assets 6%    Standard deviation 17.5%
Safe return = 2%; Flat rate Pensions
Replacement rate of state pension
0% 20% 40% 50%
Aggregate Wealth (W) 738 530 350
275
W/National Income 7.54 5.77 4.12 3.89
b =1.0
Saving Rate 16% 13% 10% 8.3%
perfect
Risky Assets/Wealth 60% 75% 89% 94%
annuities
Share of Capital Income 33% 29% 23% 20%
   
Expected Utility -113.5 -119.1 -131.8 -141.5
Equivalent prod gain -2.4% -7.2%     -10.4%
Equivalent prod gain   is the percent rise in labor productivity needed to generate the same expected
utility in a world with no state pensions.
Table 3:   Mean return on risky assets 6%    Standard deviation 17.5%
Safe return = 2%; Flat rate Pensions
Replacement rate of state pension
0% 20% 40% 50%
Aggregate Wealth (W) 804 550 345
264
W/National Income 7.98 5.88 4.06 3.27
b =0.5
Saving Rate 23% 18% 13% 10%
Semi-perfect
Risky Assets/Wealth 60% 78% 93% 96%
annuities
Share of Capital Income 35% 30% 23% 19%
   
Expected Utility -122.0 -122.7 -133.3 -142.4
Equivalent prod gain -0.3% -4.3% -7.4%
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Table 4:   Mean return on risky assets 6%    Standard deviation 17.5%
Safe return = 2%; Flat rate Pensions
Replacement rate of state pension
0% 20% 40% 50%
Aggregate Wealth (W) 915 566 335
250
W/National Income 8.68 5.95 3.95 3.12
b =0.0
Saving Rate 32% 23% 15% 11%
no
Risky Assets/Wealth 59% 82% 95% 97%
annuities
Share of Capital Income 38% 31% 23% 18%
   
Expected Utility -137.9 -126.6 -134.7 -143.2
Equivalent prod gain +4.4% +1.2%      -1.9%
Table 5:   Mean return on risky assets 4%    Standard deviation 17.5%
Safe return = 2%; Flat rate Pensions
Replacement rate of state pension
0% 20% 40% 50%
Aggregate Wealth (W) 596 411 250
185
W/National Income 7.23 5.28 3.37 2.56
b =1.0
Saving Rate 15% 11% 7.5% 6%
perfect
Risky Assets/Wealth 39% 53% 75% 85%
annuities
Share of Capital Income 20% 16% 12% 10%
   
Expected Utility -125 -127.1 -136.5 -144.8
Equivalent prod gain -0.8% -4.1%      -7.1%
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Table 6:   Mean return on risky assets 4%    Standard deviation 17.5%
Safe return = 2%; Flat rate Pensions
Replacement rate of state pension
0% 20% 40% 50%
Aggregate Wealth (W) 650 421 238
171
W/National Income 7.80 5.37 3.23 2.39
b =0.5
Saving Rate 21% 15% 9% 7%
Semi-perfect
Risky Assets/Wealth 39% 56% 79% 88%
annuities
Share of Capital Income 22% 17% 12% 9%
   
Expected Utility -136.9 -131.7 -138.0 -145.7
Equivalent prod gain +2.0% -0.4%      -3.1%
Table 7:   Mean return on risky assets 4%    Standard deviation 17.5%
Safe return = 2%; Flat rate Pensions
Replacement rate of state pension
0% 20% 40% 50%
Aggregate Wealth (W) 740 424 225
159
W/National Income 8.63 5.38 3.06 2.22
b =0.0
Saving Rate 29% 18% 10% 7%
no
Risky Assets/Wealth 38% 60% 83% 91%
annuities
Share of Capital Income 24% 17% 11% 8%
   
Expected Utility -159.7 -136.7 -139.3 -146.3
Equivalent prod gain +8.1% +7.1%      +4.5%
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Table 8
% of Population Credit Constrained by Age:
A: average rate of return on risky assets  = 6%; flat rate pension worth 40% of
average income at retirement
Age 20 25 35 80 90
b  = 1 47 29 10 0 0
b  = 0.5 47 29 10 2 15
b  = 0 46 20 10 4 33
B: average rate of return on risky assets = 6%; flat rate pension worth 20% of average
income at retirement
Age 20 25 35 80 90
b  = 1 41 25 4 0 0
b  = 0.5 41 23 7 0 0
b  = 0 40 22 8 0 2
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Table 9:   Mean return on risky assets 6%    Standard deviation 17.5%
Safe return = 2%; Final salary related, unfunded pensions
Replacement rate of state pension
0% 20% 40% 50%
Aggregate Wealth (W) 804 588 400
315
W/National Income 7.98 6.21 4.56 3.76
b =0.5
Saving Rate 23% 19% 14% 12%
Semi-perfect
Risky Assets/Wealth 60% 75% 91% 95%
annuities
Share of Capital Income 35% 31% 26% 22%
   
Expected Utility -122.0 -128.1 -141.0 -150.0
Equivalent prod gain -2.4% -7.0%      -9.8%
Table 10:   Mean return on risky assets 6%    Standard deviation 17.5%
Safe return = 2%; Final salary related, unfunded pensions
Replacement rate of state pension
0% 20% 40% 50%
Aggregate Wealth (W) 915 612 390
298
W/National Income 8.68 6.32 4.44 3.59
b =0.0
Saving Rate 32% 24% 16% 13%
no
Risky Assets/Wealth 59% 79% 94% 97%
annuities
Share of Capital Income 38% 33% 26% 21%
   
Expected Utility -137.9 -133.6 -143.4 -152.0
Equivalent prod gain +1.6% -1.9%      -4.7%
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Table 11
Gains in welfare from improvements in annuity rates:
equivalent rise in labor productivity
b  = 0.5  fi   b  = 1
average rate of return
on risky assets  replacement rate of state, unfunded pension
0% 20% 40% 50%
6% 3.5% 1.5% 0.6% 0.3%
4% 4.4% 1.8% 0.5% 0.3%
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Figure 1: Conditional life expectancy
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Figure 2: Attrition rates for pensioners - proportion surviving of those alive at 65
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Figure 4: Actual income distribution of Japanese workers (1996) and its lognormal approximation 
with standard deviation 0.45
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Figure 3: Population structure in steady state and in short run based on Japanes demographic 
projections
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Figure 6: Average life cycle income in steady state assuming current mortality rates and 50% pension 
generosity
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Figure 5: Current population structure and steady state based on current mortality rates
0.00%
1.00%
2.00%
3.00%
4.00%
5.00%
6.00%
7.00%
8.00%
9.00%
0-4 10-14 20-24 30-34 40-44 50-54 60-64 70-74 80+
Age
current population structure,
support ratio 3.65
long run population structure
assuming current mortality,
support ratio 3.09
45
Figure 7: proportion of credit constrained households in steady state assuming current mortality rates, 
50% pension, 1960-2000 risky returns with semi-perfect annuities market, time preference -1.5% and 
elasticity of substitution 0.33
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Figure 8: Average level of assets over life cycle in steady state in steady state assuming current 
mortality rates, 50% pension, 1960-2000 risky returns with semi-perfect annuities market, time 
preference -1.5% and elasticity of substitution 0.33 
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Figure 9: Average age-specific saving rate in steady state assuming current mortality rates, 50% 
pension, 1960-2000 risky returns with semi-perfect annuities market, time preference -1.5% and 
elasticity of substitution 0.33
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Figure 10: proportion of risky investment over life cycle assuming current mortality rates, 50% 
pension, 1960-2000 risky returns with semi-perfect annuities market, time preference -1.5% and 
elasticity of substitution 0.33
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